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4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
5 WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON
6 AT SEATTLE

7 NATIONAL PRODUCTS, INC.,

8 Plaintiff,

9 v.

10 PALMETTO WEST TRADING
11 COMPANY, LLC,

12 Defendant.

CASE NO. C05-345JLR
ORDER

14 **I. INTRODUCTION**

15 This matter comes before the court on the parties' request for construction of the
16 ten claim terms at issue in this patent infringement action. The court has reviewed the
17 parties' briefing and supporting materials and has heard oral argument from the parties
18 at a Markman hearing, held on April 17, 2006. This order memorializes the court's
19 claim construction for the ten terms.

21 **II. BACKGROUND**

22 Plaintiff National Products, Inc. ("NPI") brought this action against Defendant
23 Palmetto West Trading Company, LLC ("Palmetto") for infringement of two patents
24 issued in 2003. The patents cover mounting devices designed to hold car accessories,
25 such as computer screens and Global Positioning System units, in place. Palmetto, a
26 South Carolina company, began selling its rival mounting device, the Lobstermount, in
27 2004.

1 The first patent-in-suit, United States Patent No. 6,561,476, issued May 13, 2003
2 (“the ‘476 Patent”), covers a “Positively-Positionable Mounting Apparatus.” The patent
3 describes a device with a ball-and-socket mount at one end, a positively-positionable
4 mount at the other, and a coupler that simultaneously grips both ends of the device. One
5 key aspect of the invention is that the coupler has a multisided collar at one end that
6 wraps around an axle with a polygonal (rather than round) surface. This arrangement
7 allows a user to “click” – i.e., positively position – the device into one of several fixed
8 positions, without slippage. Prior known couplers, employing friction, tend to slip under
9 load.

11 Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 254,¹ the United States Patent and Trademark Office
12 (“PTO”) issued a Certificate of Correction (“Correction”) for the ‘476 Patent on October
13 11, 2005. NPI filed this lawsuit in March of 2005 for past and continuing infringement.
14 Compl. ¶ 14. For NPI’s causes of action arising before its issuance, the Correction is
15 not effective. Southwest Software, Inc. v. Harlequin Incorporated, 226 F.3d 1280, 1295
16 (Fed. Cir. 2000). Thus, the court’s construction of terms in the ‘476 Patent as originally
17 issued controls for allegations of infringement that pre-date the Correction. The parties
18 should not assume that such term construction controls for any cause of action arising
19 post-Correction.

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¹Section 254 reads, in relevant part: “[w]henever a mistake in a patent, incurred through
24 the fault of the Patent and Trademark Office, is clearly disclosed by the records of the Office, the
25 Director may issue a certificate of correction stating the fact and nature of such mistake, under
26 seal, without charge, to be recorded in the records of patents. . . . [S]uch certificate shall be
27 considered as part of the original patent. Every such patent, together with such certificate, shall
28 have the same effect and operation in law on the trial of actions for *causes thereafter arising* as
if the same had been originally issued in such corrected form.” 35 U.S.C. § 254 (emphasis
added).

1 The second patent, United States Patent No. 6,666,420, issued December 23,
2 2003 (“the ‘420 Patent”), covers a “Suction Cup Having Compact Axial Installation and
3 Release Mechanism.” The suction cup invention enables a user to increase and decrease
4 the amount of vacuum pressure inside the cup which, in turn, allows for easy
5 repositioning.
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7 In the first step toward deciding NPI’s infringement allegations, the court must
8 now construe the meaning of the terms within the asserted claims.

9 III. ANALYSIS

10 Almost ten years ago, the Supreme Court in Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc.
11 placed sole responsibility for construing patent claims on the court. 517 U.S. 370,
12 372 (1996). Subsequent authority established that the court construes claims purely as a
13 matter of law. Cybor Corp. v. FAS Tech., Inc., 138 F.3d 1448, 1456 (Fed. Cir. 1998)
14 (applying de novo review to all claim construction issues, even “allegedly fact-based
15 questions”). Executing the Markman mandate requires a court to rank the importance of
16 various sources of evidence of claim term meaning and consider them accordingly.

18 Intrinsic evidence, which includes the patent and its prosecution history, is the
19 primary source from which to derive a term’s meaning. Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415
20 F.3d 1303, 1314 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc). A patent is composed of three parts: (1) a
21 “written description,” which includes an often lengthy exposition of the background of
22 the invention, at least one embodiment of the invention, and other written material that
23 assists in understanding how to practice the invention; (2) (in most cases) a set of
24 drawings that illustrates portions of the written description; and (3) the claims, which
25 delimit the scope of the invention. General Foods Corp. v. Studiengesellschaft Kohle mbH,
26 972 F.2d 1272, 1274 (Fed. Cir. 1992). Together, these three components make up
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1 the patent’s “specification.”² Atmel Corp. v. Information Storage Devices, Inc., 198
2 F.3d 1374, 1384 (Fed. Cir. 1999); 35 U.S.C. § 112. The prosecution history exists
3 independently of the patent. It consists of the inventor’s application to the PTO and all
4 correspondence between the PTO and the inventor documenting the invention’s progress
5 from patent application to issued patent. Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d
6 1576, 1582 (Fed. Cir. 1996).

7 In its review of intrinsic evidence, the court begins with the language of both the
8 asserted claim and other claims in the patent. Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1314; Biagro
9 Western Sales, Inc. v. Grow More, Inc., 423 F.3d 1296, 1302 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (“It is
10 elementary that claim construction begins with, and remains focused on, the language of
11 the claims.”). The court’s task is to determine the “ordinary and customary meaning” of
12 the terms of a claim through the eyes of a person of ordinary skill in the art on the filing
13 date of the patent. Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1313 (quoting Vitronics, 90 F.3d at 1582).

14 The court must read claim language, however, in light of the remainder of the
15 specification. Id. at 1316 (“[T]he specification necessarily informs the proper
16 construction of the claims.”). The specification acts as a “concordance” for claim terms,
17 and is thus the best source beyond claim language for understanding claim terms. Id. at
18 1315. The inventor is free to use the specification to define claim terms as he or she
19 wishes, and the court must defer to an inventor’s definition, even if it is merely implicit
20 in the specification. Id. at 1316 (“[T]he inventor’s lexicography governs.”), 1320-21
21 (noting that a court cannot ignore implicit definitions). The court should “rely heavily”
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26 ²Although 35 U.S.C. § 112 includes the claims as part of a patent’s specification, many
27 courts and practitioners use the term “specification” to refer to all portions of a patent except
28 the claims. In most cases, the context of the discussion reveals what portion of the specification
is at issue.

1 on the specification in interpreting claim terms. *Id.* at 1317. In doing so, however, it
 2 must walk a tightrope between properly construing the claims in light of the written
 3 description and the “cardinal sin” of improperly importing limitations from the written
 4 description into the claims. *Sci Med Life Sys., Inc. v. Advanced Cardiovascular Sys.,*
 5 *Inc.*, 242 F.3d 1337, 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2001); *Phillips*, 415 F.3d at 1323 (citing *Comark*
 6 *Communications, Inc. v. Harris Corp.*, 156 F.3d 1182, 1186-87 (Fed. Cir. 1998)).
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8 Although a patent’s prosecution history is also intrinsic evidence, it is “less useful
 9 for claim construction purposes” because it usually “lacks the clarity of the
 10 specification.” *Id.* at 1317. The prosecution history is useful, however, in determining
 11 when an inventor has disavowed certain interpretations of his or her claim language. *Id.*

12 Finally, the court can consider extrinsic evidence, “including expert and inventor
 13 testimony, dictionaries, and learned treatises.” *Id.* (citing *Markman v. Westview*
 14 *Instruments, Inc.*, 52 F.3d 967, 980 (Fed. Cir. 1995)). Extrinsic evidence is usually “less
 15 reliable than the patent and its prosecution history” as a source for claim interpretation.
 16 *Id.* at 1318. The court thus need not admit extrinsic evidence, but may do so in its
 17 discretion if intrinsic evidence does not disclose the meaning of a claim term. *Id.* at
 18 1319; *Vitronics*, 90 F.3d at 1583 (“[W]here the public record unambiguously describes
 19 the scope of the patented invention, reliance on any extrinsic evidence is improper.”).
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21 In this case, the parties have cited two kinds of extrinsic evidence: dictionary
 22 definitions of claim terms and expert testimony. For the majority of disputed claim
 23 terms, the intrinsic evidence is sufficient to either confirm that the inventor used the term
 24 in its ordinary sense or to reveal the precise departure from the ordinary meaning that
 25 the inventor intended. As such, the court discusses dictionary definitions only where
 26 necessary and declines altogether to rely on Palmetto’s expert in construing the terms.
 27 See *Trilogy Communications, Inc. v. Times Fiber Communications, Inc.*, 109 F.3d 739,
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1 744 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (“When . . . the patent specification and the prosecution history
2 adequately elucidate the proper meaning of the claims, expert testimony is not necessary
3 and certainly not crucial.”).

4 With this general framework in mind, the court turns to the claim terms in
5 dispute.

6 **A. Construing The Term “Wheel-and-axle assembly” in the ‘476 Patent**

7 The term “wheel-and-axle assembly” means an assembly formed from the arm
8 member’s multisided part collar in cooperation with the multisided positional mount.

9 Claims 1, 5, and 11 cite two elements that cooperate to form a wheel-and-axle
10 assembly: a “multisided part collar” and a “multisided positional mount.” Claim 5
11 further specifies that a multisided positional mount is comprised of a disc-shaped wheel
12 portion and multisided axle portion. From here, Palmetto contends that the definition of
13 wheel-and-axle assembly must include a “concentrically mounted disk portion” in
14 addition to the multisided part collar and multisided positional mount.

15 The court adopts NPI’s interpretation that the “wheel-and-axle assembly”
16 requires nothing more than what the inventor claims: a multisided positional mount and
17 a multisided part collar. Biagro, 423 F.3d at 1302 (“claim construction begins with, and
18 remains focused on, the language of the claims.”). Here, only Claim 5 imparts a
19 limitation that the wheel-and-axle assembly must also include a disc-shaped wheel
20 portion. Claims 1 and 11 make no mention of such an element. Given that each claim
21 in a patent is presumptively different in scope, the court declines to construe Claims 1 or
22 11 to contain a limitation expressed only in Claim 5. Comark, 156 F.3d at 1186-87.
23 Here, the “disc-shaped wheel portion” is an optional element, but not necessary to define
24 a wheel-and-axle assembly.

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1 The inclusion of a “disc-shaped button or wheel portion” in describing one
2 embodiment of the assembly does not change this result. At the outset, the court notes
3 that the inventor need not describe all possible forms in which the claims may be
4 reduced to practice. Gart v. Logitech, Inc., 254 F.3d 1334, 1342 (Fed. Cir. 2001)
5 (noting that “drawings [depicting the preferred embodiment] are not meant to represent
6 ‘the’ invention or to limit the scope of coverage defined by the words used in the claims
7 themselves.”). What is more, the written text and figures describing a particular
8 embodiment should be read in light of the specification as a whole. Beckson Marine,
9 Inc. v. NFM, Inc., 292 F.3d 718, 724 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (“this court does not construe the
10 figures depicting a single preferred embodiment as limiting the claim terms in light of
11 other language in the written description embracing other . . . structures.”).

13 Here, Figures 3A and 3B illustrate one embodiment of a wheel-and-axle
14 assembly formed of the positively-positionable mount formed on a mounting base. The
15 figures include a depiction of a positively-positionable mount shaped like a mushroom,
16 which includes a “disc-shaped button or wheel portion.” ‘476 Patent, col. 3, lines 56-58.
17 To paraphrase NPI, this button or wheel acts as a “stopper,” NPI Brief at 9, to ensure
18 that “the arm members of the coupler . . . can obtain a suitable grip [around the axle].”
19 Id., col. 4, lines 4-7; see also, id., col. 4, lines 31-35 (describing same). Despite this
20 stated objective, the drawings do not include the coupler’s rigid arm members (of which
21 the multisided collar is part). The accompanying description to the Figures, however,
22 explicitly references the arm members and directs the reader to further discussion that
23 follows. ‘476 Patent, col. 4, lines 4-7. Not only does the court refuse to read Figures 3A
24 and 3B in isolation from the remaining written description, Beckson, 292 F.3d at 724,
25 but the inventor expressly instructs against it. Indeed, throughout the specification, the
26 inventor describes the coupler’s rigid arm members in relative orientation to the
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multisided positional mount's multisided axle portion. E.g., id., col. 4, lines 20-25; id., col. 5, lines 4-8; col. 6, lines 18-21. Thus, the fact that Figures 3A and 3B include a disc-shaped wheel portion and omit the multisided collar is not dispositive in light of the surrounding written description and the clear language of the claims themselves.

B. Construing Terms in the ‘420 Patent

1. “An aperture communicating between . . .” and a “second opening communicating between . . .”

“[A]n aperture communicating between the housing drive surface and the recess” means an opening through the housing where the housing drive surface is aligned with the recess. A “second opening communicating between the concavity and the external reaction drive surface” means an opening through the housing where the housing drive surface is axially aligned with the recess.³

The parties present identical arguments for both of the above terms, found in Claims 1 and 15, respectively. Palmetto contends that, in both instances, “an aperture” or “opening” means a single hole and that “communicating between” refers to providing a direct connection between two surfaces. NPI argues that the claims are not limited to a single opening and that the communication between the two surfaces need not be direct. The parties do not dispute that aperture means opening and vice versa.

For both terms, the claim language and specification do not exclude the possibility of more than one opening or aperture. First, both Claims 1 and 15 use the transitional phrase “comprising” in their respective preambles. “Comprising” is an open-ended term which creates a presumption that the invention is made up of at least as many elements as described. Gillette Co. v. Energizer Holdings, Inc., 405 F.3d 1367,

³The court's construction of the terms adopts those provided by NPI in the Amended Joint Claim Chart (Dkt. # 49).

1 1371-73 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (holding that “comprising . . . a group of first, second, and
2 third blades” in patent for safety razors encompassed a four-bladed razor). Moreover,
3 the use of the article “an” before “aperture” in Claim 1 tends to suggest the possibility of
4 more than one such opening. Elkay Mfg. Co. v. Ebco Mfg. Co., 192 F.3d 973, 977
5 (Fed. Cir. 1999).

6 Claim 15 assigns an ordinal to the aperture element: “*a first* opening on the
7 surface [of the housing concavity]. . . and a *second* opening communicating between the
8 concavity and the external reaction drive surface” ‘420 Patent, col. 13, lines 4-6
9 (emphasis added). The court construes the numbering in this instance as merely
10 differentiating between multiple references to an element; as such, the term “second”
11 does not confine the claim to include only one such opening. See Innovative Props. Co.
12 v. Avery Dennison Corp., 350 F.3d 1365, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (“use of the terms ‘first’
13 and ‘second’ is common patent-law convention to distinguish between repeated
14 instances of an element” and should not necessarily be interpreted to impose a serial
15 limitation on a claim).

16 Without intrinsic support, Palmetto argues for an additional limitation that the
17 opening’s “entire purpose” is to provide a *direct* connection between two surfaces.
18 Palmetto Resp. at 5. The specification teaches, however, that the purpose of the aperture
19 is to allow for a drive shaft to pass through, a point which Palmetto conceded at oral
20 argument. ‘420 Patent, col. 4, lines 66-67; ‘420 Patent, col. 4, lines 28-31. There is no
21 indication from the claim language or the specification that such purpose must be met
22 via a pathway that provides a direct connection between the housing recess and the
23 external reaction drive surface. Both Claims 1 and 15 refer to an opening that simply
24 communicates between two “aligned” surfaces. ‘420 Patent, col. 11, line 8; id., col. 13,
25 line 6. Palmetto’s dictionary definition appears to undermine its argument:

1 “communication” is a “means of connecting different places, such as a door, passage,
 2 road, or railway.” The Concise Oxford Dictionary 268 (9th ed. 1995). By this
 3 definition, an aperture could provide a means for connecting two surfaces via a direct
 4 pathway or a passage that spans two distant places. Accordingly, the court declines to
 5 adopt Palmetto’s limitations.
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7 **2. “[A] drive shaft coupled to” and “a drive shaft coupled at one end to a**
suction cup”

8 “[A] drive shaft coupled to” means a drive shaft linked with and “a drive shaft
 9 coupled at one end to a suction cup” means a drive shaft with an end portion linked to a
 10 suction cup.
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12 The parties dispute whether the term “coupled,” found in Claims 1 and 15,
 13 describes a connection between two distinct parts. Palmetto argues that the suction cup
 14 and drive shaft are two separate features, while NPI contends that the two can exist as an
 15 integrated piece.

16 The court declines to read a limitation into the broad term “coupled.” See
 17 Verizon Cal. Inc. v. Ronald A. Katz Tech. Licensing, L.P., 326 F. Supp. 2d 1060, 1077
 18 (C.D. Cal 2003) (“[O]ne of ordinary skill in the art understands the term ‘coupled’ to
 19 connote a broad range of associations between two things.”). The parties agree that the
 20 ordinary use of the term means to join or link together. It does not follow that the term
 21 necessarily implies the physical joining of two separate components. Id. at 1078; see
 22 Johnson Worldwide Assocs., Inc. v. Zebco Corp., 175 F.3d 985, 992 (Fed. Cir. 1999)
 23 (holding that “coupled” does not necessarily require a mechanical or physical coupling).
 24 Indeed, one embodiment in the specification indicates a drive shaft and suction cup
 25 “integrally” molded of the same material. ‘420 Patent, col. 7, lines 12-18. Even so,
 26 Palmetto argues that these “few lines” from the specification contradict the clear
 27 language of the claims. Palmetto Resp. at 6-7. Thus, according to Palmetto, the
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1 inventor may have disclosed such an embodiment, but failed to claim it. The court
2 disagrees. There is no contradiction between the specification and the claim given the
3 broad definition of the term “coupled.” The court rejects Palmetto’s veiled attempt to
4 limit the claim in such a way as to exclude one embodiment. See Vitronics, 90 F.3d at
5 581 (an interpretation that would exclude an embodiment “is rarely, if ever, correct”).
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7 **3. “Spiral installation drive surface”**

8 “Spiral” means a three-dimensional curve that turns around an axis at a fixed or
9 varying distance.

10 The parties do not dispute the meaning of “installation drive surface.” The
11 dispute is whether the term “spiral,” found in Claim 1, means rounded or helical.

12 The court concludes that spiral is used according to its ordinary definition, cited
13 above. The term helical is impermissibly narrow; a helix describes a *type* of spiral that
14 turns around an axis at a constant diameter, whereas the term spiral can also encompass
15 a three-dimensional curve that turns around an axis at a varying distance. Palmetto
16 attempts to narrow the definition by citing what appear to be helical drive surfaces
17 depicted in Figure 4. There is no indication that the patentee intended the claims and the
18 embodiments to be strictly coextensive; rather, Figure 4 is exemplary in nature. ‘420
19 Patent, col. 7, lines 19 (illustrating “one embodiment”). As such, the court declines to
20 depart from the ordinary meaning of “spiral” and impose a limitation on the term based
21 on one figure disclosed in the specification. Gart, 254 F.3d at 1342; Phillips, 415 F.3d
22 at 1323. As to NPI’s proposed definition, the court finds no support in the intrinsic
23 evidence that the patentee intended to act as his own lexicographer in defining “spiral”
24 to mean round.
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1 **4. “Lip portion sized larger than the first opening” and “the peripheral
2 lip portion projecting beyond the first opening thereof”**

3 A “lip portion sized larger than the first opening” means a portion of the suction
4 cup sized to project beyond the first opening of the housing; and “the peripheral lip
5 portion projecting beyond the first opening thereof” means the peripheral lip portion of
6 the suction cup extending beyond the first opening of the housing.

7 For both terms, Palmetto contends that “sized larger” and “projecting beyond”
8 should be limited to mean that the outer lip of the suction cup is obviously larger to a
9 “non-expert observer.”

10 There is no intrinsic evidence to support Palmetto’s proposed limitation on these
11 two terms. The specification teaches that the purpose of sizing the outer lip larger than
12 the opening is so that the suction cup can properly come into contact with the surface to
13 which it attaches. ‘420 Patent, col. 6, lines 60-65 (“the lip portion . . . of the elastically
14 resilient material [is] structured to . . . keep[] the peripheral lip from being drawn into
15 the concavity”). There is no basis for limiting *how much* larger the suction cup lip must
16 be, just that it is sized in such a way that it does not get drawn into the housing.

17 Palmetto attempts a common sense argument that “as a matter of simple physics” the lip
18 portion of the suction cup must be obviously larger than the housing to perform its job.
19 Palmetto’s Resp. at 8. Nothing in the intrinsic evidence supports this limitation of an
20 “obvious” size differential; indeed, common sense just as easily suggests that a person
21 practicing the invention could fashion the lip portion behind another structure or so
22 finely calibrate the cooperating or integrated elements such that sizing is not at all
23 obvious to the observer. The court rejects Palmetto’s proposed limitation and adopts
24 NPI’s construction, which tracks the claim language.

1 **5. “Means engaged between the distal portion of the plunger drive shaft
2 and the annular installation drive surface for drawing the plunger
3 drive shaft outwardly”**

4 The parties agree that this term requires a means-plus-function analysis pursuant
5 to 35 U.S.C. § 112. The parties also substantially agree that the function is just what is
6 stated in the claim: to “draw[] the plunger drive shaft outwardly through the second
7 opening in the housing when the rotational drive member is rotated in a first direction
8 relative to the external reaction drive surface.” ‘420 Patent, col. 13, lines 31-32; col. 14,
9 lines 1-2. The court adopts this cited function.

10 The parties disagree as to what structure fulfills this function. NPI contends that
11 the structure is limited to whatever is found between the drive shaft and the annular
12 installation drive surface. Palmetto contends that the necessary structure involves a
13 minimum of three parts: (1) a drive pin, (2) a hole in the plunger drive shaft, and (3) a
14 helical ramp surface.

15 When construing a means-plus-function claim, the court must hunt in the
16 specification for the structure that fulfills the stated function. Micro Chem., Inc. v.
17 Great Plains Chem. Co., 194 F.3d 1250, 1257-58 (Fed. Cir. 1999). The court must
18 interpret such a claim to encompass “*all* structure in the specification corresponding to
19 that element and equivalent structures.” Id. (emphasis added).

20 The court concludes that the corresponding structure necessary to fulfill the cited
21 function is an installation drive pin, a hole in the plunger drive shaft, and a spiral
22 installation drive surface. ‘420 Patent, col. 3, lines 5-10 (describing a drive shaft with a
23 means for interacting with the spiral installation drive members to move the drive shaft
24 outwardly); id., col. 6, lines 43-47 (describing a hole in the drive shaft for the
25 installation drive pin); id., col. 9, lines 24-26 (“During rotation, the installation drive pin
26 comes into contact with a upwardly ramping axial installation drive surfaces.”); id., col.
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1 9, lines 42-46 (“In effect, motion of the installation drive pin upwardly along the
2 installation drive surfaces pulls the drive shaft of the plunger and out of the concavity”).
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4 NPI conceded at oral argument that a drive pin could not alone pull the plunger
5 drive up when the drive member rotates. Nevertheless, NPI argues that the court should
6 confine its search for the necessary structure to a particular location; namely, whatever
7 is between the drive shaft and the installation drive surface. The court is not aware of,
8 nor does NPI cite, any authority that indicates that the court should disregard necessary
9 structure simply because the claim language discloses *some* structure. Indeed, disclosure
10 of some structure does not preclude applicability of traditional means-plus-function
11 analysis; it may, as here, simply set the context for describing such function. Laitram
12 Corp. v. Rexnord, Inc., 939 F.3d 1533, 1535 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
13

14 **6. “Means for securing the plunger drive shaft in fixed rotational
15 orientation to the annular installation drive surface”**

16 Again, the parties agree that this term requires a means-plus-function analysis and
17 generally agree as to the stated function. The court concludes that the function is to
18 secure the rotational orientation of the plunger drive shaft relative to the annular
19 installation drive surface.
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21 The court concludes that the structure necessary to perform the stated function is:
22 a drive pin, or equivalent, and a positional keeper portion of the rotational drive member,
23 such as a detent saddle that engages the pin. For near identical reasons as stated above,
24 the court rejects NPI’s proposed construction that seeks to exclude some of the
25 necessary structure to perform this function. The specification provides that a saddle
26 operates as the “anti-rotation locking mechanism.” ‘420 Patent, col. 7, lines 48-49. In
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1 turn, “[i]rrespective of configuration, the installation drive and [sic]⁴ rests on the shelf
 2 portion.” id. That is, as stated by Palmetto at oral argument, the detent saddle “seats”
 3 the drive pin. A detent saddle alone does nothing in the way of performing a function
 4 without cooperation with some *other* element. NPI admits as much in its brief when it
 5 states that the saddle “serve[s] to catch the drive pin or other drive shaft engagement
 6 means at a particular angle of rotation.” NPI Brief at 23. As such, the court largely
 7 adopts Palmetto’s proposed structure: a drive pin, or equivalent, and a positional keeper
 8 portion of the rotational drive member, such as a detent saddle that engages the pin.

10 **IV. CONCLUSION**

11 This order concludes the claim construction process for the disputed terms before
 12 the court. As stated above, the court’s construction of the terms in the ‘476 Patent as
 13 originally issued controls for allegations of infringement that pre-date the Certificate of
 14 Correction issued on October 11, 2005. At this time, if the parties wish to amend their
 15 allegations of infringement or invalidity based on the recently filed Correction, the court
 16 directs the parties to consult the court’s original scheduling order in this matter, which
 17 requires the asserting party to show “good cause.” (Dkt. # 27 at 4). The moving party
 18 should accompany such a request with a proposed revised case schedule, which the
 19 court will note for consideration seven judicial days after filing. Local Rules W.D.
 20 Wash. CR 7(d)(2)(A).

21 Dated this 4th day of May, 2006.

22 s/James L. Robart

23 JAMES L. ROBART
 24 United States District Judge

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 26
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 28 ⁴The “installation drive” term in this clause references element 42, which is uniformly
 referred to as an “installation drive pin” in the remainder of the specification.